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ficulty in the case of a discharge for consideration since a definite
consideration would have to be clearly established; and as Commissioner Drury very aptly states, "We do not deny that an obligor in a
note may be released by parol evidence, but such evidence should be
clear, satisfactory and td the point." Finally, let it be said that th4
result in the principal case is the one most compatable with the Intent
of the drafters of the N. I. L., and the one which In the vast majority
of situations is most just from the point of view of the business man.
In conclusion, it might be said that the most notable thing in the
case is thei learned and thorough way in which it was handled. It Is
believed that this is, perhaps, the most erudite opinion to be found in
the Kentucky Reports. It sets out an exhaustive list of authorities
bearing on the subject, and gives the reader an, opportunity of viewing
the problem from all angles; thus, it does not force one to accept the
conclusion of the judge through lack of information. Rather, it sets
out the different rules adopted by the various courts applicable to this
set of facts, and then by close study and comparison, attempts to
arrive at the most logical solution. An analysis such as this is certainly more conducive to an acceptance of the opinion as a proper
statement of the law than a one-sided opinion in which the opposite
view is not set out or considered at all.
KIK B. MonBELEY.

PLEADING-STATUTE 0P FRAUDS MAY Ba RAISED By DEmusuzn.Deceased and wife, plaintiff, agreed to make mutual wills, each leaving his or her property to the other. This was done but subsequently
deceased made another will leaving his property to his heirs. After
probate of the first will, this second will was produced and the order
probating the first will was set aside and another order entered admitting this second will to probate. The plaintiff then sued to set aside
this second probate, to reinstate the first will and to have the prolerty distributed thereunder. She claimed that this agreement to make
mutual wills gave her a lien upon the property of her husband and
that from the date of execution her husband held the land in trust
for her benefit. Defendants demurred and on hearing of the demurrer it was held that this contract was within the Statute of Frauds and
being oral was unenforceable. Plaintiffs contended that defendants,
if they wished to rely upon the Statute of Frauds, must have pleaded
it affirmatively. He7d: "The question as to whether a contract is
within the Statutes of Frauds may be raised by demurrer." Gibson
v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985 (1932).
The question as to whether the Statute of Frauds may be raised
by demurrer, for ease of discussion, is divided into two groups of factual situations: (1)
where the pleading alleges an oral contract
within the purview of the Statutes of Frauds and alleges no circumstances to take the transaction out of the operation of the statute;
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(2) where the pleading is silent as to whether the contract sued upon
is oral or written.
In the first situation the great weight of American authority is
to the effect that the statute may be raised by demurrer. Thompson
v. W. S. Coal Co., 135 Ala. 630, 34 So. 31, 93 Am. S. R. 49, 62, L. R. A.
551 (1903); Seamans v. Barentsen, 180 N. Y. 333, 73 N. E. 42, 105 Am.
S. R. 659 (1905); Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261, 19 Am. R. 449
(1875); Dilckey v. McKinlay, 163 Ill. 318, 45 N. E. 134, 54 Am. S. R. 471
(1896).
The minority rule, namely, that the Statute of Frauds may not be
raised by demurrer, finds its strongest support in North Carolina.
Ingram v. Corbit, 177 N. C. 318, 99 S. E. 18 (1919). In a fairly recent
case in Alabama the court reverted to the old English rule that,
although the statute could be raised by demurrer in an action in
equity, it could not be raised in an action at law. McDonald v.
Mcdonald, 215 Ala. 179, 110 So. 291 (1926).
This distinction seems
indefensible in view of the fact that the codes have abolished the
distinction between law and equity, at least, in such a sense as this.
The Federal courts follow the majority rule. Norton v. Stegmyer,
175 Fed. 56, 99 C. C. A. 332, 20 Ann. Cases 1134 (1910); Babe v.
Danaher,756 Fed. (2d) 777 (1931). The Supreme Court early decided
that a demurrer would raise the statute in Randall v. Howard, 2 Black
585, 17 L. Ed. 269 (1862).
A general demurrer is usually regarded as sufficient. Barr v.
O'Donnell, 76 Cal. 469, 18 Pac. 429 (1888). But it has been held that
the demurrer should state the ground of objection relied on. Lewis'
Comrs. v. Breakwater Fisheries Co., 12 Del. (Ch.) 208, 110 Atl. 669
(1920).
Kentucky, at first, inclined to the view that a party could not avail
himself of the Statute of Frauds on demurrer. Kirby v. Chitwood's
Admr., 4 T. B. Mon. 91, 16 Am. Dec. 143 (1826).
But the statute in
Kentucky putting writings signed by the parties upon the same footing as sealed instruments, Ky. Stats. sec. 471, has changed the rule
and all such writings evidencing any contract must now be declared
on as specialties; and if the petition does not aver a writing It will be
considered as made by parol. Ball v. MeCrea, 8 B. Mon. 423 (1848);
Altman and Taylor v. Joplin, 5 K. L. R. 184 (1883).
Thus it will be seen that Kentucky is one of the few jurisdictions
which Is in a position to hold that, not only will a demurrer lio
where it clearly shows that the contract sued upon is oral and within
the Statute of Frauds and no circumstances are alleged to take it out
of the statute but, also In situation number twcl where the pleading
Is silent as to whether the contract sued upon is oral or written,
Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154 S. W. 900, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907
(1913); Smith v. Thcobald, 86 Ky. 141 (1887); Caudill v. J. P. Gorman Coal Go., 242 Ky. 294, 46 S. W. (2d) 93 (1932). This rule also

K. L.-8

450

KENTucKY LAw JouRNAI

seems to prevail in Indiana. McCoy v. Mc0ey, 32 Ind. App. 38, 69 N. E.
193 (1903). But the vast amount of authority is to the contrary.
Speyer v. Desjardins, 144 Ill. 641, 32 N. E. 283 (1892); Van Epps v.
Redfield, 68 Conn. 39, 35 At. 809 (1896).
From the foregoing statements it will be seen that the principal
case represents the modern view in Kentucky and also that this view
is with the weight of authority to the extent of a pleading which
clearly shows a case for the application of the Statute of Frauds. It
is not inconsistent with this majority view when it allows the statute
to be raised by demurrer although it does not appear on the face of
the pleading that the contract is written or parol. The settled rule
in Kentucky is that the pleader must allege a written contract or circumstances removing the case from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds. It such were not the rule, undoubtedly Kentucky would follow the majority view that the statute could not be raised by demurrer.
The majority view appears preferable in the light of reason. If
the pleader, who should undoubtedly be in a better position to state
his ease than any other, can do no more than state a contract, which,
on its face, is unenforceable, then such pleading should be demurrable.
ROBERT E. HATTON, JR.
CRIMus-H
IZcE IN DEFENsE OF PROPERT.--While homicide in
self-defense, and homicide in defense of habitation have historically
been considered justifiable, there has been some confusion regarding
homicide in defense of property other than habitation. Just how far
may the owner go in defending his property? Does a mere trespass
justify taking a human life? Are common law felonies and statutory
felonies against property to be considered alike?
A recent Kentucky case, Comnonwealth v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34
S. W. (2d) 941 (1931), involved the right of a citizen to kill another
apprehended at night in the act of stealing his chickens. The jury
in the lower court did not agree, and the Court of Appeals was asked
to certify the law in the case. The defendant shot without warning
and continued to fire after repeated requests to stop. He had no evidence that the men were armed, but testified that he feared for his
life. The Court of Appeals certified that the defendant was entitled
to an instruction on self-defense carrying the idea that he shot in
good faith on reasonable grounds to apprehend immediate danger to
his life, but that Lhe jury should also be informed that the defendant
could be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter on the theory that
he used more force than reasonably necessary to prevent the taking
of the chickens. While taking chickens valued at more than three
dollars is a statutory felony in Kentucky, the law does not justify the
taking of human life to prevent a felony not involving the security of
the person or home, or in which violence is not a constituent part.

